Measuring the Impacts of Labor in the Platform Economy: New Work Created, Old Work Reorganized, and Value Creation Reconfigured by Bearson, Dafna et al.
UC Davis
UC Davis Previously Published Works
Title
New Work and Value Creation in the Platform Economy: A Taxonomy and Preliminary 
Evidence
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3db8m55f
Authors
Bearson, Dafna
Kenney, Martin
Zysman, John
Publication Date
2019-03-30
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
BERKELEY ROUNDTABLE ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
 
 
 
BRIE Working Paper 
2019-3 
DEPENDENT ENTREPRENEURS IN THE PLATFORM 
ECONOMY: PLAYING IN THE GARDENS OF THE 
GODS 
Donato Cutolo and Martin Kenney  
 Dependent Entrepreneurs in a Platform Economy: Playing in the Gardens of the Gods 
 
Donato Cutolo 
University of Bologna 
Bologna, Italy 
 
And 
 
Martin Kenney 
Distinguished Professor 
University of California, Davis 
 
“The court (platform) maintains its power by remaining secretive about its operations. And since it is accountable 
to no one except itself, it does not have to make its actions public.”  
 
“Since the court (platform) is a closed system that operates on its own rules, and since the court's (platform’s) 
power is so absolute, it is effective at rebuffing any effort from outsiders (complementors) – including ambitious 
defendants (complementors) – to penetrate its mysteries.” (Apologies to Franz Kafka) 
 
Acknowledgements: The authors thank John Zysman for comments on an earlier draft and Rana McBee for 
editorial and research assistance. Martin Kenney thanks Kauffman Foundation and BRIE/CITRIS for funding the 
research and thinking behind this paper. 
  
ABSTRACT 
 
Digital platform firms are among the most valuable firms in the world due, in large part, to the ecosystems of 
complementors that have emerged around them.  We explore the contradictory impact that platforms have on 
entrepreneurship. The ecosystem metaphor used to describe the network of interdependencies among the members 
is intrinsically flawed because it obscures the god-like powers of the platform owners. In fact, complementors are 
dependent entrepreneurs whose businesses and existence is largely determined by the platform owner.  We show 
that digital platforms ease entrepreneurial entry by lowering entry costs and providing boundary resources to 
attract and support complementors. And yet, businesses dependent upon digital platforms are extraordinarily 
precarious. The reasons for this precariousness include the extraordinary visibility that platform owners have over 
all participants, an ability to unilaterally change the terms and conditions of participation, and even become a 
direct competitor to entrepreneurs dependent upon the platform. We describe the limited strategies that dependent 
entrepreneurs can utilize in an attempt to mitigate their dependence. We suggest that the relegation of 
entrepreneurs to dependence requires a new way of thinking about entrepreneurship as platforms continue their 
march to centrality in the global economy. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Digital platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Etsy, Google search advertising, Instagram, YouTube and 
many other platforms make it easier than ever for entrepreneurs to build a business and generate income.  And 
yet, as Franz Kafka suggests for those entrepreneurs building businesses on the platform, that is the 
“complementors,” any misstep, many of which are identified by the all-seeing algorithms, can lead to summary 
judgement followed by Kafkaesque adjudication processes. Today, both entrepreneurs and existing businesses 
must navigate a world where customers want to purchase online, and an online presence is necessary. As a 
result, participation in a platform’s ecosystem has become vital for existence and growth (Kenney & Zysman, 
2016; Parker et al., 2016). The economic centrality of platforms heralds a new reality for entrepreneurs. 
At least since Joseph Schumpeter, it has been recognized that entrepreneurs discover and create 
opportunities and build new independent firms (Alvarez &Barney, 2007; Audretsch, 2007). More recently, 
scholars such as Brynjolffson and McAfee (2014) have hailed entrepreneurship as a vital response to the 
increasing concerns about digitization’s impact on the future of work. Platform researchers have emphasized 
the importance of platform complementors in providing variety and innovation that generates a platform’s 
“ecosystem” (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009; Parker et al., 2016). While recognizing the tremendous new 
business opportunities created by online platforms, we differ from many by arguing enterprises dependent 
upon a platform are not independent, in the traditional sense of the term, but can be better understood as 
“dependent entrepreneurs.” We explore the profound impact upon entrepreneurs that the “platform economy” 
is having upon the enormous number and variety of entrepreneurs (Aldrich & Ruef, 2018). 
The remarkable shift of business-to-consumer activity online has led to a fundamental shift in power to 
the point that the digital platforms intermediating economy activity have transformed the market.  As a result, 
vast swathes of the economy are being structured by platform firms. Entire constellations of producers, sellers, 
and even specialized service providers have emerged around the largest platforms. Even firms that are not 
directly running their business on digital platforms are affected by the online services such as Google search 
and ranking algorithms - for many firms, not appearing in Google search results is tantamount to non-
existence. In large measure, the study of the impacts of platforms has concentrated up on labor platforms such 
as Uber (e.g., Cramer & Krueger, 2016) or Upwork (Popiel, 2017), crowdfunding (Sorenson et al., 2016) or 
retail (Khan, 2016). And yet, despite its transformative impact, the implications of the platform economy on 
entrepreneurs has been less studied (for a few exceptions, see Nambisan, 2017; Sussan & Acs, 2017; Autio et 
al., 2018). Of course, platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Etsy, Facebook, Google, Lyft, Uber, and others are the 
result of venture capital-funded entrepreneurs. However, as Aldrich and Ruef (2018) demonstrate, these 
venture capital-financed entrepreneurial successes are only a fraction of the total society-wide entrepreneurial 
activity. Where studies have been conducted regarding the impact of digital platforms on entrepreneurs and the 
entrepreneurial process, most studies have been laudatory or not considered the impact upon the businesses 
that become dependent upon the platform.   
This article explores the contradictory impact that platforms have on entrepreneurship (Nambisan, 
2017; von Briel et al., 2018; Autio et al., 2018). We show that the entrepreneurial process, which is already 
characterized by high risk, is both eased and more precarious when it is dependent upon a platform. The 
precarity is increased as their venture is vulnerable to unilateral, largely irresistible, and often unappealable 
decisions made by the platform owner for their benefit. Dependent entrepreneurs face risk that is incalculable 
as the platform has god-like powers that range from complete visibility into the dependent entrepreneur’s 
business to the ability to unilaterally change any terms of participation up to suspension and removal from the 
platform resulting in a loss of any and all equity in their business (Zuboff 2019). As a result, the dependent 
entrepreneur suffers not only the normal risks and anxiety that come with building a firm, but an even greater 
uncertainty that comes to their dependence upon the platform. We also explore the pitfalls of using the 
ecosystem metaphor to describe the economic space created for complementors. 
The paper begins by defining what platforms are and discussing their role in entrepreneurship. We 
then critique the ecosystem metaphor as being fundamentally misleading as to the true nature of the 
relationship between the platform and its complementors. While we continue to use the term ecosystem and 
complementors, the fourth section describes the resources that the platform provides to members of its 
ecosystem and sets the base for unraveling their dependency. The fifth section introduced the concept of 
dependent entrepreneurs and describes the powers that the platform owner wields over those in the ecosystem, 
arguing that entrepreneurship in such an environment is fundamentally different than normal 
conceptualizations of entrepreneurship. In the sixth section, we describe some of the strategies dependent 
entrepreneurs have developed to resist platform power. The discussion and conclusion explore the implications 
of our results for understanding entrepreneurship today. 
2. Entrepreneurs and Platforms 
Platforms have been defined in a variety of ways (Baldwin & Woodward, 2009; Parker et al. 2016; 
Evans et al. 2006). We adopt Gawer’s (2014) definition “that platforms are evolving organizations or meta-
organizations that: (1) federate and coordinate constitutive agents who can innovate and compete; (2) create 
value by generating and harnessing economies of scope in supply or/and in demand side of the markets; and 
(3) entail a modular technological architecture composed of a core and a periphery.”  Our discussion is 
confined to online software platforms because they have powerful generative potential -- that is, they enable 
the creation of new output, structure or behavior often without direct input from the system originator (Zittrain 
2008). This is accomplished by the provision to platform users of various social and technical boundary 
resources (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson 2013) that attract complementors to join and thereby constitute its 
ecosystem (Jacobides et al. 2018).  While it is true that complementors join a platform’s ecosystems for 
various reasons (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015; Jeppesen & Frederiksen, 2006), the contributors of interest to us 
are those that do so with entrepreneurial intent. 
The platform business model has demonstrated such disruptive power that many platform firms are 
among the world’s most valuable corporations (Moazed & Johnson, 2016). With the forthcoming initial public 
offering for other digital firms such as Uber, Slack and Airbnb, in a few years it is possible that digital 
platforms may organize even greater swathes of the economy, thereby having even greater implications for 
entrepreneurs. 
Digital platforms facilitate but also shape the emergence of novel entrepreneurial opportunities. When 
conceptualizing entrepreneurial opportunity emergence it is important to consider the role of contextual 
elements or enablers such as “single, distinct, external circumstances, which—by affecting supply, demand, 
costs, prices or payoff structures—can play an essential role in eliciting and/or enabling a variety of venture 
development attempts” (Davidsson, 2015, p. 684). Although contextual elements operate at the environment-
level and can be actor-independent, particular actors often influence or even have a central role as external 
enablers (Davidsson, 2015). Digital platforms, by orchestrating entire ecosystems of value creation and 
exchange (Nambisan, 2017) and by providing resources for various stages of the entrepreneurial process (von 
Briel, Davidsson, & Recker, 2018), are, not only external enablers, but also open new spaces within which 
entrepreneurs can create new firms1. Effectively, they become the context for entrepreneurial action.  
Platform-based entrepreneurs may deviate from the stereotypical Silicon Valley high-growth startup 
and are often more mundane retail or service businesses (Barley, Bechky, & Milliken, 2017). These enterprises 
are remarkable in their variety and establishing a knitwear shop on Etsy, eBay, Amazon, or any number of 
other platforms, creating a YouTube channel, writing apps, creating a reselling business on Amazon, starting a 
business based on Google advertisement referrals are only random illustrations of the endless typologies of 
businesses that can be established on a digital platform (Haefliger, Jäger, & Von Krogh, 2010; Keinan et al. 
2015; Kim, 2018). This enormous population of entrepreneurs is largely unstudied as scholars have focused on 
the platforms. This omission is remarkable, if one considers the sheer number of these entrepreneurs (Table 
                                                     
1 Joseph Schumpeter theorized that new technologies or other market changes could open new economics spaces to be 
occupied by entrepreneurs that construct new business models capable of exploiting the opportunities.   
One shows the number of entrepreneurs populating the major platforms). 
 
Table One: Largest Transaction Platforms and Estimated Revenue of Ecosystem Complementors  
Platform 
Date 
Established Description 
Revenue 
2017/18 
Number of 
Entrepreneurs 
2017/18 Source 
Apple 
iOS/App 
Store 2008 Marketplace $46.6 B 2 million apps Wikipedia 
Amazon* 1995 Marketplace $42.8 
~100,000 sell 
more than 
$100,000 per 
year, 2 million 
total 
https://www.entrepreneur.com/a
rticle/303532 
Google 
Play 2008 Marketplace $24.8 B 2.7 million apps Wikipedia 
eBay 1995 Marketplace $10.7 B 
6.7 million 
merchants in 
US, 2017; 25 
million globally, 
2018 
https://expandedramblings.com/
index.php/ebay-stats/, 
https://smallbiztrends.com/2018
/03/ebay-statistics-march-
2018.html 
YouTube 2005 
Video 
sharing $8.2 B 
40,000 full time 
creators / 
12,000,000 total 
channels * 
100% = 0.33% 
https://medium.com/@Morjax/h
ow-many-youtube-creators-
could-be-full-time-
6ecd1636bfc1 
Etsy 2005 Marketplace $3.9 B 
>2 million 
active merchants 
https://investors.etsy.com/~/med
ia/Files/E/Etsy-IR/annual-
report-proxy-materials/etsy-
ar2017.pdf 
Shopify 2004 
Software for 
online sales $673 M 
<600,000 
merchants 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sh
opify 
Instagram 2010 
Video 
Sharing 
social media N/A 
25 million 
active business 
accounts 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/11/
30/instagram-25-million-
business-profiles/ 
Amazon 
Publishing 2007 Marketplace N/A 
639,149, 
Quarters 2, 3, 4, 
2017 that sold at 
least one book 
http://authorearnings.com/report
/january-2018-report-us-online-
book-sales-q2-q4-
2017/#comment-299004 
* Amazon Marketplace third-party revenue 
The preponderance of research of entrepreneurship focused on extraordinary firms that are described 
as gazelle and unicorns, rather than studying the far more common ordinary entrepreneurs (Aldrich & Reuf 
2018). The dearth of research on entrepreneurs on digital platforms is even more problematic when we realize 
that essentially all entrepreneurship today is predicated upon being in a platform ecosystem. To illustrate, the 
sale of consumer goods has been transformed by Amazon. Amazon and other digital platforms are where 
consumers learn about and search for goods (Dennis 2017). The growing centrality of platforms is evidenced 
by the need for even the most powerful established brands to establish a presence on Amazon. To illustrate, 
Nike and Apple had resisted selling through Amazon in part for fear of undercutting their existing vendors, 
however in 2018 they capitulated and began selling on Amazon (Galloway, 2018; Kelley, 2018).  
To appreciate the impact of platform economy, it is important to explore how entrepreneurial action 
changes when it is in the context of a platform ecosystem. The character of entrepreneurship depends on the 
context, which have their own rules, threats, and opportunities (Autio et al., 2014). In addition to market rules, 
which are a common factor regulating economic dynamics, other contextual features may either facilitate, 
hinder, or have contradictory impacts on entrepreneurial success, e.g., the presence of venture capital locally or 
legal structures such as the existence of non-compete agreements (Marx et al., 2009).  
The next section addresses the commonly adopted ecosystem framework and explains why it suffers 
from a suffers conceptual flaw that conceals the dependent nature of entrepreneurial dynamics in platform-
organized markets. 
3. The Ecosystem and Complementor Metaphor: Concealing Dependent Entrepreneurship   
The ecosystem metaphor was imported into business in the 1990s and has become remarkably popular 
(Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018; Moore 1993). In ecology, an ecosystem is defined as an interdependent 
collection of plants and animals or a structured system of communities governed by general rules (Chapin et al. 
2002).  This definition was extended to describe how spatially proximate interdependent organizations interacted 
to create mutually shared benefits and, quite early, was introduced to describe the Silicon Valley industrial system 
(Bahrami &Evans 2000). In these situations, there is no organizing entity determining the rules of engagement for 
the other participants or with the power to unilaterally exclude, change terms of engagement, or absorb the 
functions of other ecosystem actors.   
To conceptualize the interdependencies between the actors involved, their shared destiny and the complex 
architecture of their interactions, the literature on digital platforms adopted the concept of ecosystems (Iansiti & 
Levien, 2004a; Tiwana, Konsynski, & Bush, 2010; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). While the literature recognizes 
the prominent role of the ecosystem’s “keystone” player (Iansiti & Levien, 2004b), increasingly, a private firm is 
responsible for the viability of the entire ecosystem. To illustrate, it would be laughable to suggest that the lions in 
the savannah can decide to expand their role to displace the gazelle or require the dung beetle to change its 
operations. Or, in sociological settings, such as Silicon Valley, for venture capitalists to decide to become law 
firms, or unilaterally dictate that the law firms contract-writing function be ceded to venture capital firms. In 
contrast to these ecosystems, the platform owner wields enormous asymmetric power over other ecosystem 
members.    
The literature nearly always suggests that within these ecosystems the complementors and platform 
owners share similar objectives in relation to the value proposition to customers (Jacobides et al., 2018; Nambisan 
& Baron 2013). Wareham et al. (2014, p. 1198) refer to complementors “as autonomous actors, act as 
entrepreneurs, invoking the speed of market mechanisms while focusing their own portfolio of domain expertise, 
sector knowledge, and relational capital to create locally relevant solutions.”  
This collaborative image where platform owners and autonomous complementors “depend on each other 
and share a common fate” (Tiwana et al, 2010, p.52) with flattened power structures existing between the actors 
leads to successful platform owners having “hundreds if not thousands of partners [that] also participate in 
platform-based ‘ecosystem’ innovation” (Gawer & Cusumano 2014, p. 417). These authors do not reflect upon 
what “partnership” means in markets controlled by a platform with power to determine the rules of engagement or 
to unilaterally punish or even exclude its partners. 
A platform firm is a business interested in profits. The platform’s owners are able to “impose rules and 
constraints, create inducements and otherwise shape behaviors” (Boudreau & Hagiu 2009, p. 3). The other 
ecosystem actors must “surrender part of their autonomy and independence” (Nambisan & Baron, 2013, p. 1073) 
to align their businesses with the desires of the platform leader (Tavalaei & Cennamo, 2018). As a remarkable 
example of the ambiguity surrounding these ecosystems, scholars recognize that platform owners can and do 
absorb the businesses of their complementors and identify the different motivations behind platform owners’ 
decisions to compete against and often destroy their complementors (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Gawer & 
Henderson, 2007; Zhu & Liu, 2018). For them, the decision to absorb or eliminate their complementors’ 
businesses is portrayed as a mechanism to defend the ecosystem, aimed at exercising better quality control (Zhu 
& Sun, 2018) or at stimulating innovation with a better customer experience (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). In 
contrast to these benign interpretations, Zhu and Liu (2018) confirmed, showing that Amazon entry patterns into 
market segments created by independent merchants are aimed at appropriating the value of its most successful 
complementors.  
Because platform owners can impose rules, boundaries, and directions, complementors bear the risks of 
entrepreneurship, while lacking the freedom and independence typical of an independent business (Nambisan & 
Baron, 2013).  Scholars studying digital platforms have mostly embraced an ownership perspective to look at the 
strategies and the dynamics put in place to generate and maintain value in the ecosystem (Gawer & Cusumano, 
2002; Gawer & Henderson, 2007; Boudreau, 2010), hence the issues faced by complementors are under-
investigated (Tavalaei & Cennamo, 2018). The effect of these power dynamics on the myriad small 
complementary businesses is only explored in passing. 
We have indicated that the “ecosystem” metaphor is problematic and yet it is not entirely incorrect. There 
is a growing recognition among scholars that more research should be devoted to the members of business 
ecosystems (Kapoor & Agrawal, 2018).  Platforms provide significant resources to their ecosystem members, 
which is what we discuss in the next section, because paradoxically it is these resources that provide the 
asymmetric power to the platform owner who has a “god’s” view and the ability to unilaterally expel any 
complementor or customer, and/or change the rules that govern the community.  
 
4. Entrepreneurs, complementors and resources 
Joining a platform ecosystem as a complementor by definition is acceptance of the goals and general 
value proposition of the platform owner (Nambisan & Baron, 2013). To be successful, a digital platform 
requires complementors and consumers to populate its ecosystems. Therefore, platforms provide all manner of 
incentives to join their ecosystem. All things equal, the greater the number of complementors, the more robust 
is the platform and greater the total value created in its ecosystem (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). Of course, it is 
possible as Boudreau (2012) finds that there may be a limit to the number of complementors able to join a 
platform ecosystem. To attract entrepreneurs, platform owners must provide access, opportunities, resources, 
and even subsidies since the provision of tools lowering the costs of connecting to the platform and accessing 
customers encourages platform adoption. In the economics literature, these resources are modeled as subsidies 
(Boudreau & Hagiu 2009). In this section, we enumerate the most salient resources that are used to attract 
entrepreneurs to introduce complementary services. 
4.1 Customer access 
For entrepreneurs, the fundamental benefit is access to potential customers i.e., the platform’s 
matching function. Taking advantage of connectivity, they reduce costs of discovery and transaction. This is 
true whether it is a market platform or an advertising supported platform. The scope of these markets can range 
from global for online sales to extremely local such as locating a Lyft driver. To illustrate, in 2018 Etsy 
marketplace hosted more than 2 million vendors and approximately 40 million buyers (Etsy & GfK, 2017). In 
this case, Etsy allows entrepreneurs who join as complementors access to customers globally. By aggregating 
large numbers of users, they make discovery possible, thereby creating new spaces for entrepreneurs. 
4.2 Access to resources 
All new ventures typically require a variety of resources, including capital, skilled employees, 
networks, and customers, to overcome the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Platform ecosystems are 
organized to attract entrepreneurs by providing access interfaces, templates, manuals, and other technical 
support either gratis or at very low cost. Moreover, platforms must develop and offer these resources even 
though they may be losing money because they are dependent upon attracting complementors. Since these 
resources are meant to facilitate complementary product development, they act to lower entry barriers 
(Nambisan, 2017; Nambisan, Siegel, & Kenney, 2018). In Table Two, the variety of resources offered by Etsy 
are listed and described.  
Table Two: Selected Resources Provided to Entrepreneurs by Etsy 
Services Free or 
Paid 
Type of service Description 
Application 
Programmi
ng 
Interfaces 
Free Auxiliary 
resources 
Etsy APIs allow the creation 
of apps to manage listings, 
analyze sales history and 
feedback, control shop 
appearance and access 
certain customer information. 
In 2019, 70 APIs were 
available on website 
Etsy 
Handbook 
Free Training Educational resources, such 
as articles, webinars, and 
posts that teach sellers how 
to start, manage and scale 
their Etsy businesses. These 
address taxes, shipping, 
marketing, with updates every 
week 
Etsy Craft 
Entreprene
urship 
Free Training Educational program for 
underserved communities  
Etsy 
Payment 
Paid Auxiliary 
resources 
Dedicated system provided by 
Etsy to streamline payments 
for sellers and buyers 
Etsy 
Training 
Videos 
Paid Training Online videos to improve 
sales 
Etsy 
Forums 
Free Community 
Building 
Advice, discussion of 
changes, etc. 
Etsy Stats Free Site Analytics Information on traffic, listings 
and customers 
The scale of investment in these resources to lower entry barriers and facilitate the 
complementor’s business can be enormous, as it includes engineering for APIs and data analysis, 
marketing and sales information, training, and other resources. Platforms such as YouTube have 
permanent facilities (YouTube spaces) in key cities globally. These co-investments with their 
complementors create sunk costs and lock-ins that increase the dependency of the entrepreneurs that 
use them.  
 
4.3 Platform-derived complementor legitimacy  
Digital transactions because of their anonymity are marred by inherent lack of trust between parties 
that do not know each other and whose transactions are unlikely to be repeated (Josang et al., 2007).  
Complementors benefit from the systems that platforms have put in place to address this fundamental fact. The 
first and most widely recognized feature for increasing trust is seller and buyer ranking and commenting 
systems that provide ex ante information from previous users to both transaction parties. Moreover, ranking 
systems can be used to monitor and discipline ecosystem members. The second feature for overcoming lack of 
trust is that the platform uses both algorithmic and human curation searching for dishonest or undesirable 
listings, such as, for example, counterfeited products on sales platforms or copyright violations on YouTube.2 
The third feature is customer service representatives that make final decisions in dispute resolution. As a 
package, these features provide legitimacy and value to platform entrepreneurs and facilitate transactions. 
  
4.4 Lower opportunity costs 
Opportunity costs are an entry barrier to entrepreneurs (Amit, Muller, & Cockburn, 1995). In the case 
of digital platforms, these barriers are often very low and can begin with part-time activities. For example, 
many YouTubers began in their bedroom or dorm rooms, eBay sellers began by selling miscellaneous items. 
There are many anecdotes about how amateur activities evolved into full time professional businesses 
                                                     
2 We are not arguing that these are flawless, only that they exist and provide some reassurance regarding the appropriateness 
of the product. 
(Demetry, 2017; Kim, 2018). The low-entry allows amateur action to evolve into more professional activities 
and, as we described earlier, the platform actively provides resources to encourage such actions.  
The success of a digital platform is predicated upon attracting users and complementors. It does this by 
lowering entry barriers and reducing risk and, when successful, they foster ecosystems where entrepreneurs 
become the platforms’ complementors (Eckhardt, Ciuchta, & Carpenter, 2018; Nambisan et al., 2018). The 
eased entrance into the ecosystem has the contradictory effect of, over time, creating a lock-in effect due to the 
asset specific nature of the investment and the lack of portability of the cumulative investment by the 
complementor in terms of reputation, transaction history, and repeat customers. The next section explores the 
features of a platform that transform entrepreneurial action from an assertion of independence to a state 
dependence. 
 
5. Mechanisms for Creating Dependency  
Entrepreneurs establishing their business on a platform face a fundamentally different context (Autio 
et al., 2014) from traditional entrepreneurs that establish firms in the physical world. To attract them the 
conditions for engagement must be attractive -- often so attractive that the platform will lose money to achieve 
lock-in.  This is particularly the case when the entrepreneurs must make significant asset-specific investments. 
These asset-specific investments integrate the dependent entrepreneur, from now DE, into the platform’s 
ecosystem.  The greater the investment, and often these are cumulative, the greater the dependence on the 
platform. Ceteris paribus, the more successful an entrepreneur is on a platform, the more dependent they are.   
Of course, all entrepreneurs face remarkable challenges. However, a business built upon a platform 
faces a unique set of risks that emanate from the platform itself. In a recent study, Wen and Zhu (2018, p. 16) 
found that app developers responded to the threat and subsequent entry of Google into competition with their 
app by undertaking “no entry deterrence behavior, such as price reduction and additional innovation...because 
of the platform owner’s power, its entry is unlikely to be deterred.” This response suggests that they 
understood that resistance was futile. In this section, we describe the characteristics of platform-based markets 
that contribute to this competitive asymmetry.  
5.1 Platform as panopticon 
The platform owner has a God’s eye view of the actions of the other ecosystem participants (Boudreau 
& Lakhani, 2009). The term “asymmetric information access” under-estimates this power (Shapiro & Varian, 
1998). The platform not only can observe all the activities, but it also decides what information the 
complementors are given. In multi-sided platform markets the owner rations the specific information the 
various sides receive; all of which is optimized for the benefit of the platform owner. 
This power is illustrated in an interview with a former Amazon employee who stated that it retained 
“the most valuable data for itself; provides less valuable data to marketplace sellers.” They continued that the 
“most valuable info Amazon doesn’t share is info about which people have searched for a particular product in 
the past.” This allowed Amazon to “target their private label products with perfect precision” (Capitol Forum, 
2018). On these platforms, the DE has only the knowledge about the customer that platform provides. The 
ability to see all actions of the platform, while providing only carefully selected data to the complementors 
(and customers) ensures maximum leverage to the platform owner.   
5.2 Entry into the dependent entrepreneur’s business  
The platform is central to all interactions and has the ability to direct traffic. This centrality and the 
panoptic endowment enable the platform to identify vendors or market segments that are particularly lucrative. 
This combined with centrality of the platform allows the introduction of a competitive product or 
establishment of a “tax” to appropriate the surplus. For example, when threatened with the browser as a new 
killer application, Microsoft destroyed the new entrant, Netscape and its business model, by introducing a 
“free” Internet Explorer that was bundled into the operating system (Yoffie & Cusumano, 1998). Effectively, 
Microsoft leveraged the Windows operating system to absorb functions developed by its ecosystem member, 
Netscape (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011). Of course, the platform owner may not always be 
successful in absorbing the functions of complementors. To illustrate, assisted by the Department of Justice’s 
blockage of Microsoft’s acquisition on antitrust grounds, Intuit resisted Microsoft and its Money software 
program and remained the market leader (Newman, 1997).3   
For online digital platforms, there is greater visibility into the ecosystem than in the PC era. For 
example, Amazon can identify independent third-party vendors whose products are selling well in its 
marketplace, examine the product and decide whether the profit margins are attractive. It can then enter the 
market through its 136 private label brands and 373 exclusive brands (TJI, 2019). This process was described 
by a former employee:  
“Let’s say Amazon wants to get into folders. I would find all of the ASINs [Amazon Standard 
Identification Number] that are being sold on the website now. I’d pull up the history. I’d look at the 
volumes, price points. Regardless of whether it was sold wholesale or third party, I’d pull it all 
together. I’d look and see what’s the hottest product. What’s the hottest variation in color? We’d have 
these folders in these colors at this price point, and we’d go off and make it ourselves.” (Capitol 
Forum, 2018, p. 3). 
Dominant platforms can survey activities on their platform, research the opportunity, and decide 
whether it is economically viable to enter that specific market -- whether it was pioneered by an entrepreneur 
or an established firm. Effectively, for the DE the business that they have built is vulnerable to expropriation 
without recourse.  
5.3 Input control  
As the ecosystem curator, platform owners must manage their complementors in the ecosystem – a 
necessity or the platform ecosystem can become dysfunctional (Thies, Wessel, & Benlian, 2018; Jacobides et 
al. 2018).  On all platforms, input control ensures that complementors abide by the terms and conditions for 
participation (Tiwana 2015; 2014). While this is not the typical principal-agent problem, there are similarities. 
For the DE, input control is a vexing issue, because for consignment-based platforms the content-creation 
investment must be made prior to acceptance of the product (often digital) for sale/distribution. Because the 
platform may change acceptance criteria at any time and without warning, the DE’s business model is 
                                                     
3 Microsoft did not offer the Money program for free, something it could have done to destroy Intuit. 
precarious. For example, recent decisions by Google, YouTube, and Facebook to demonetize, ban, or demote 
various websites are based upon a change in direction in what content should be allowed. Because platform-
organized markets are largely winner-take-all, the DE’ products cannot simply be shifted to another market 
and sold -- there is often only one market. 
5.4 Changing the terms of participation 
The decision to enter a market is based upon understanding the operative rules for participation.  In an 
offline business, these terms include leases, supplier and customer relationships, and government regulation, to 
name the most salient. To participate on a platform, users must agree to the terms and conditions. One key 
clause in all of these is that they can be changed unilaterally at the discretion of the platform owner. Terms of 
participation have two components: First, “hard” components that are the core of the platform, i.e., the 
software, algorithms, etc., and including the software development kits (SDKs), application programming 
interfaces (APIs) etc. These are boundary resources provided to the complementors. Second, there are “soft” 
components, which are included in the platform’s contractual terms and conditions. Such rule changes can 
jeopardize not only the profits but also the survival of the complementor (Nambisan, 2017).  
The price of a product and the entrepreneur’s profit margins are existential decisions and fundamental 
to being an entrepreneur. For entrepreneurs using a digital platform, issues such as the share of revenue 
accruing to the platform and the complementor is invariably set solely at the platform owner’s discretion. To 
illustrate, in fall 2018, eBay unilaterally announced an increase in its commission fees in the Books, DVDS, 
and Movies categories to 12%, while removing the fee discount that eBay Store owners enjoyed (Steiner, 
2018). Even prices may be set by the platform. For example, for self-published books in the Kindle 
marketplace for books priced from $2.99 to $9.99 Amazon pays the author 70% of the retail download price, 
but only 35% for those priced above or below. Amazon arbitrarily forced its complementors to accept its 
desires. In some cases, DEs cannot even control their pricing.   
5.5 Platform access  
Platform owners act as private regulators that are expected to reduce negative externalities created by 
complementors in order to maximize the value for the system as a whole (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009; Evans, 
2012). The profit of the platform owner and the value of the ecosystem are directly linked, and insufficient 
control over opportunistic behaviors by “complementors” may degrade the ecosystem and even result in the 
failure of the platform itself (Täuscher & Kietzmann, 2017). Platforms then are strongly incentivized to 
perform their regulatory role, and they can rely on a large set of enforcement instruments, including exclusion 
(Strahilovetz, 2006). Although exclusions can be for bad behavior (Evans, 2012), it can just as easily be 
“distorted away from pure value creation in the ecosystem towards actions that lead to higher platform profit” 
(Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009, p.8). Platform owners are meant to be a neutral or, at least, a trusted party. As an 
example, Apple agreed to sell on Amazon; the quid pro quo was that the unauthorized independent Apple 
resellers had their listings removed (Kelley, 2018). The mechanisms required to protect the ecosystem can be 
used for exclusion to pursue other goals of advantage to the core firm. The risk of anti-competitive exclusions 
poses a potential threat to any entrepreneur using a platform.  
 
5.6 Complementor and customer relationships 
For a platform to be an intermediary, it is essential that the vendor be separated from their customer. 
The DE depends upon the platform to maintain the connection and, if the entrepreneur loses platform access, 
then the customer access is also lost. To illustrate, YouTubers actively cultivate their community by interacting 
with their fans to build their followers. If YouTube blocks a creator, they immediately lose access to their fan 
base and have no way of contacting them to move their customer base to a new platform. eBay uses machine 
learning to identify violations of its policy forbidding the exchange of contact information between buyers and 
sellers (Meldner 2017).   
The separation of providers from customers is normal at most platforms. For example, in 2019 Apple 
launched a magazine subscription service on which publishers could provide their content to Apple, which 
would then aggregate and provide it to Apple users for a $10 per month fee, of which Apple would retain 50%.  
This service separated publishers from their readers (Sloane, 2019). Most importantly, once established, this 
separation would be difficult to reverse. Separation from one’s customers gives “ownership” of customers to 
the platform. Once the platform owns the customer, it can unilaterally set conditions of customer engagement. 
The ownership of the customer shifts enormous power to the platform owner.  
 
5.7 Ranking Systems as Control Mechanism 
Ranking systems are essential features of many platforms because they function as mechanisms to 
foster trust, identify lower prices, and to direct traffic (Jøsang et al., 2007).  As such, ranking systems can aid 
discovery and reduce transaction uncertainty (Tadelis, 2016).4  Further, there is a correlation between ranking 
and click-through behavior (Ghose et al., 2014). Indeed, users are more likely to select a higher ranking item -- 
whether in search results or a ranking system. Ranking scores can be used to discipline complementors. They 
can directly influence customer preferences: Luca (2011) found that a one-star increase in Yelp rating led to a 
5-9 percent increase in a restaurant revenue and visibility.  
The power of the ranking systems is that those doing the ranking are most often anonymous and the 
platform makes it difficult to appeal negative rankings. As important, invariably the algorithms generating the 
rankings, the data and the weighting system are opaque. It is in the platform owner’s best interest to not reveal 
the algorithms to prevent manipulation and opportunistic behavior. An aura of objectivity can conceal the 
platform’s agenda, which can be designed to provide results beneficial to its goals. As a result, the ranking 
system and particularly changes can appear to be capricious (Scott & Orlikowski, 2012). Since these 
algorithms are proprietary and evolve over time, complementors’ only avenue of recourse is to appeal to the 
platform itself. While most studies have seen these as a form of decentralized labor control (Scott & 
Orlikowski, 2012; Schor & Attwood-Charles, 2017), the DE experience the same uncertainty.  
 
5.8 Business Suspension 
Complementors’ access can be suspended for any actions deemed as an infraction of rules that can 
change with no prior notice. Often, suspension is governed by algorithms that constantly monitor actions on 
the platform. The difficulty is that algorithms and even human agents can be wrong and thus access may be 
                                                     
4 In China, where inter-personal trust was particularly low, Alibaba’s innovation was to hold the payments in a trust account 
until the purchaser accepted the product and authorized payment. 
unjustifiably interrupted. In some cases, infractions reported to the platform may actually be the product of 
unethical competitor behavior (Luca & Zervas, 2016; Woollacott, 2017). 
For the DE, suspension has immediate financial repercussions. There is no possibility of immediate 
appeal and the platform need not provide sufficient information to understand the reasons for suspension. As a 
Kafkaesque result, DE are forced to appeal a decision which was made for unexplained reasons. The frequency 
of sanctions on platform entrepreneurs has grown to the point that there are now consulting companies that 
specialize in dealing with platform decisions (Dzieza, 2018) and even firms such as InsuraTech, that offer 
insurance to cover lost sales and additional costs triggered by a suspension -- of course, all of these are costs 
borne by the DE. 
5.9 Concluding thoughts 
For the entrepreneurs, the platform has a contradictory character. First and particularly initially, the 
platform provides many resources for the DE. In return, the platform benefits from the their innovations and 
entrepreneurial effort, which attract users and often the platform shares in the income produced. As the 
platform and ecosystem grows and matures, the importance of the individual complementor decreases. Of 
course, as a business, the platform owner seeks to increase its revenues and profits. In Figure One, we provide 
a stylized representation of this process. As we show, a non-DE will have greater difficulty entering the 
market, because they have to produce or secure access to resources that a platform provides. Therefore, entry is 
more difficult and expensive. However, assets such as reputation, customers etc. belong to the non-DE who 
neither benefits from the platform nor is immediately vulnerable to its decisions. Thus, as the non-DE’s 
business matures, it faces fewer risks than does the platform complementor.  
 
 Figure One: A Stylized Representation of the Risk Profile of a Non-Platform-Based and Platform-
Based Entrepreneurial Firm 
 
6. Responses of Dependent Entrepreneurs 
DEs understand their status and have developed responses. This section describes the most salient 
responses. Most of these actions are problematic because they take place within a platform’s ecosystem where 
it controls the nexus of communication and has a vested interest in ensuring that actions to create 
countervailing power are defeated. Given its god’s eye view of activity, detection of DEs’ responses meant to 
weaken the platform’s power will elicit a powerful response and there is normally little recourse. However, DE 
have developed responses that deserve greater study.  
6.1 Multi-homing 
Multi-homing refers to the ability for DE to offer their product or service on multiple platforms 
(Kenney & Pon, 2011). Multi-homing comes with a cost, as the entrepreneur must customize their offering to 
each platform’s specifications. Multi-homing can increase platform entrepreneurs’ power, though due to 
network effects, the platforms often are either monopolies or oligopolies, such as is the case for smartphones, 
ride sharing, search, and social media, etc. In the case of smartphone operating systems and their respective 
app stores, the platform duopoly offers minimal alternatives for complementors. In other cases, such as search 
advertising, the alternatives to Google are nonexistent.  
For the DE, offering their product or service on multiple sites is desirable, but it may not be simple. To 
illustrate, after introducing a new app update, Snapchat’s Android app, when compared to its iOS app, was 
buggy and this had a significant negative impact on revenues (Constine, 2019).  In other cases, uploading 
videos to both YouTube and Instagram is easy due to various software applications. However, even when easy, 
the platform’s goals, payment algorithms, audiences, and formatting are different and thus successful porting 
requires optimization – an additional cost. 
To remain successful, a platform must retain its complementors and therefore implement measures to 
make multi-homing difficult. For example, e-books purchased for use upon Amazon’s Kindle cannot be easily 
ported to other viewing devices. Another tactic is to prevent entrepreneurs from informing their 
audience/customers that they are moving to another platform, or even that they offer content on another 
platform. For example, YouTube cracked down on creators that promoted their streams on the competitor 
platform, Twitch. Creators that did such promotions had their accounts terminated with no warning (Vincent, 
2018). Multi-homing is a common response for DE, but almost always is resisted by the platform.  
6.2 Diversification of income sources 
Diversification of income sources is another strategy to ease dependence. On certain platforms it is 
possible to establish a variety of income streams. For example, YouTubers that have large followings can 
leverage them to create income sources beyond those generated by advertising.  As Figure two illustrates, 
YouTubers leverage their audience to generate income from personal appearances, merchandise sales, in-video 
product placements, offer paid content such as classes, etc. Because advertising income is low, for all but the 
most successful YouTubers, some combination of other income sources are vital. Not surprisingly, this can 
expose a tension between the DEs’ intent upon diversifying their income streams and the platform aiming to 
increase income and prevent detection. YouTube introduced new rules meant to capture either a portion of the 
alternative income or, at least, direct it through YouTube. In 2017, YouTube began blocking the YouTubers’ 
appeals for their followers to pledge funds to their Patreon sites, and instead forced them to route the funds 
through YouTube’s Channel Memberships (Kulp, 2017).5  
 
Figure Two: The Diversified Income Streams for YouTubers 
The ultimate problem for owners is when the complementor develops alternative sources of income to 
the point at which they no longer need the platform, such as was the case with Justin Bieber, who initiated his 
career on YouTube, but became a mainstream star and left the platform. Similarly, authors can use Amazon 
self-publishing to launch their careers and the most successful can move to traditional publishers. A final 
example are the successful online brands that establish physical stores, in part, to diversify due to the fact that 
their online operations are entirely dependent upon platforms such as Amazon or Instagram. Cultivating 
alternative income sources can counterbalance platform dependency. 
6.3 Collective action 
Collective action by DEs can include a wide range of actions. These range from complementors 
                                                     
5 To better control sponsorships, in 2016 YouTube acquired FameBit, a firm that connects creators with br 
and sponsorships. Here, YouTube created a direct competitor with the larger ecosystem where a cottage industry of firms that 
connect creators with sponsors had emerged.  As part of YouTube, FameBit can provide superior information to 
complementors (Weiss, 2018) thereby having an advantage over competitors and, as importantly, further “capturing” the 
ecosystem complementors. It also means that YouTube will have even better visibility into the success rates of 
advertisements. 
forming user forums where they can discuss the platform’s actions and, perhaps, develop self-help strategies, 
e.g., Turkopticon (Silberman & Irani, 2015), to withholding their products or services from the platform.  
Finally, if the platform rules or ecosystem become sufficiently difficult, DE may leave with the ultimate result 
being the demise of the platform. Thus far, most collective action has been confined to complaints regarding 
changes in the terms and conditions (Dunphy, 2017), and has not progressed further.     
Collective action can be effective, despite the fewer organizing tools in virtual environments where the 
“public space” is, in fact, owned by the platform. For example, in November 2018 AbeBooks (owned by 
Amazon) banned several antiquarian booksellers because their countries did not have acceptable banking 
institutions. In solidarity with their competitors, hundreds of booksellers removed their listings. Given the 
strong response, AbeBooks reversed its decision (Flood, 2018). In this particular case, the DEs had 
alternatives, were tightly networked, and there was little prospect of replacements, such as would occur if, for 
example, YouTubers withheld videos en masse. 
Generally, DE face the platform as individuals, often as competitors. Collective action is normally 
confined to protesting rule changes and requesting that the platform reconsider its actions. In most cases, 
providers are scattered globally and cannot even identify each other. Moreover, when there are websites 
established for interacting and discussing various issues, they have no way of excluding platform 
representatives from participating incognito. Effectively, the conditions for solidarity such as a common 
workplace or community that exist in the physical world are far less prevalent in the virtual world. 
6.4 Disintermediation 
By definition, platforms function as intermediaries between various parties. If the parties are able to 
identify each other, then it may be possible for them to disintermediate the platform for future transactions. 
Such disintermediation is most likely to occur when repeated interactions build trust. With sufficient trust, 
through an off-platform communication medium, DE can connect directly with their customers, thereby 
excluding the platform and sharing the platform’s fees. Disintermediation is an existential threat for a platform, 
since circumvention unequivocally damages the platform owner’s power (Zhu & Iansiti, 2019).  
6.5 Legal Action 
Because the relationship between the platform and its DE has largely been the province of contract 
law, there has been comparatively little litigation by complementors as they joined the platform voluntarily and 
can leave freely. This may be changing as the European Union competition authorities have investigated and 
fined some platforms for violations. In the U.S., there has been some greater attention to platforms such as 
Amazon (Khan 2016). In other countries, there have been actions. In India, for example, small retailers 
successfully pressured the government to promulgate new rules that make it difficult for retail platforms, such 
as Amazon and Walmart-controlled Flipkart, to sell directly to consumers and operate an online marketplace. 
This action would prevent a platform from competing directly with their complementors. Where the 
complementors may be viewed as workers such as is the case with Uber and Lyft, there have been a series of 
court cases arguing that the drivers are not contractors (or micro-entrepreneurs), but rather should be classified 
as employees. Recently the music platform, Spotify, argued that the 30% fee Apple charges for all downloads 
to the iPhone are unfair competition, because of the newly introduced Apple Music (Ek, 2019). In response, 
Apple argues that the fee is reimbursement for its vetting function that protects the ecosystem (Apple, 2019). 
How far legal action will progress to protect DEs is unknown. 
6.6 Summation 
As we have shown, DEs actively prosecute strategies aimed at weakening the platform’s grip. The 
strategies to counterbalance the platform’s power can be effective, but they are costly especially from smaller 
firms.  Not unexpectedly, the platform will either passively or actively oppose attempts to weaken its grip over 
its complementors.  The conundrum is that the platform is expected to curate the ecosystem, because if it is 
uncurated it is likely to experience a tragedy of commons (Hardin 1968). However, the curation role, in the 
case of platform firms, is conducted by an interested party and therefore may lead to judgements in its own 
favor. 
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
Platforms have already been acknowledged as having a profound effect upon labor and labor relations  
(Kenney & Zysman, 2018) and the nature of competition (Khan 2016; Parker et al. 2016). Research on 
entrepreneurial dynamics in platform ecosystems has concentrated upon ease of entry, market access, and other 
such technical conditions. With very few exceptions, the unequal power relationship between the platform 
owner and the ecosystem complementors has been ignored. When the relationship between owner and 
complementor is discussed, it is in terms of commensalism and mutual benefit. Clearly, the platform owner as 
the provider of tools and ecosystem curator is necessary and deserves compensation. And yet, the power 
asymmetries are so stark that complementors are best understood as dependent entrepreneurs whose very 
existence depend upon the platform. 
Consider again entrepreneurs in the pre-Internet platform era. Certainly, Microsoft could destroy 
ecosystem complementors, as Netscape discovered to its chagrin. However, for a variety of reasons including 
US antitrust enforcement, Microsoft was limited in its use of platform dominance to enter the business of its 
various complementors that were either other software vendors or personal computer producers. Today, due to 
consumer choice, all manner of economic activities are being organized by platforms. Whether in retailing, the 
production of music, news commentary or software in their infinite variety, the provision of rides or 
accommodations, and all manner of other products and services; both entrepreneurs and existing businesses are 
being integrated in platform ecosystems. Platforms provide the entrepreneurs various boundary resources to 
ease of market entry, access to customers, and legitimacy. In return, the entrepreneur’s business is vulnerable 
in ways that simply were not the case in the offline world. An entrepreneur whose business is dependent upon 
a platform experiences a level of precarity that is far greater than the entrepreneur in the pre-platform era. The 
DE’s business is entirely exposed to the platform owner’s panoptic gaze.   
Entrepreneurship and building a business has always been an undertaking fraught with risk. However, 
the willingness to bear this risk has been coupled with the notion that success can substantially be shaped by 
one’s own actions -- a world within which most capable entrepreneurs build a sustainable business 
(Sarasvathy, 2008). Dependence upon a platform challenges such assumptions as precarity extends to the 
actual foundations of the business itself, as platform owners can control access to customers, prices, profit 
margins and even survival.  
Reconceptualizing entrepreneurs in a platform economy as dependent is particularly useful when we 
consider that increasing numbers of scholars are proposing that entrepreneurship is an effective response to the 
evolution of work to be more contingent, fluid and uncertain (Barley et al., 2017). The platform’s provision of 
resources to entrepreneurs is a poisoned chalice, because it also locks in the entrepreneur. What is the meaning 
of entrepreneurship in a platform ecosystem? How can dependent entrepreneurs enact the ‘emancipatory 
potential of entrepreneurship’ (Rindova et al., 2009)? What are the entrepreneur’s degrees of freedom in 
developing their business when the platform can identify entrepreneurs reaping Schumpeterian rents and 
envelope them?  
Awareness of the encompassing power of these platforms is increasing and the precarity of 
entrepreneurs dependent upon these systems appears to be growing. A business that is not discoverable 
through Google’s search effectively does not exist, suggesting that current discussions of regulating platforms 
still has not grasped the dynamics of the new business environment within which platforms are taking on god-
like powers able to banish complementors from the garden, are able to see all actions in their realm, separate 
parties to a transaction, and unilaterally change the conditions for any and all users – either in very granular 
fashion or comprehensively. Governments have only begun to become aware that these platform gods only 
now are beginning to act upon their powers. For example, recently the Indian government required that 
Amazon and Walmart-owned-Flipkart decide whether they were online retailers or sales platforms, but that 
they could not have both their own inventory and be an online marketplace. Our work thus contributes to the 
debate on the regulation of digital platforms. In response to the growing number of grievances against unfair 
treatment, policy makers have been increasingly concerned with the appropriateness of current policy 
frameworks to promote sustainable and healthy environment for platforms’ entrepreneurs. Recently the 
European Commission have reached a political deal on the adoption of a regulation that applies to the entire 
platform economy, including online marketplaces, app stores, social media for business, and also search 
engines, aimed at reinforcing trust and promoting fairness and transparency in the platform-to-entrepreneur 
relationship (European Commission, 2019).  
What is certain is that entrepreneurship researchers must also study the power asymmetries that are 
inherent in the contemporary economy, if they want to understand the dynamics of these platform-organized 
markets and provide a more compelling picture of entrepreneurship in the digital era. 
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